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Contemporary Jesuit Epistemological Interests
James G. Murphy SJ1
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Loyola University Chicago

Apart from an orientation to and interest in the discernment of spirits as laid out in St
Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises, there does not exist a Jesuit epistemology as such.
Compared to the numbers of Jesuit systematic theologians, scripture scholars,
metaphysicians, and ethicists, there have been few Jesuit epistemologists. 2 In
metaphysics, Jesuits have been Thomist or Suarezian, even Platonist. In ethics, they have
ranged from proportionalist through deontologist to virtue ethicist. No similar distinctive
Jesuit presence is to be found in epistemology.
On the other hand, from its earliest years, the Society of Jesus has been committed to
education, not just in theology and philosophy but also in the humanities and the
sciences. That commitment has led it into wide engagement with different ways of
knowing, to a diversity of interpretations of the world, human beings, and God.
Accordingly, the focus of this article is not Jesuit epistemologists as such, but
epistemic aspects of Jesuit ventures: it attempts an overview of how Jesuits have grappled
with issues of knowledge in theology, philosophy, and the sciences, roughly since the
second Vatican Council (1962-65). It ranges across how they have viewed the epistemic
status of experience and perception, the role of theory and interpretation, the appropriate
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ways to link theology and the sciences, the nature and sources of moral knowledge, the
role of the Spiritual Exercises and particularly the discernment of spirits as an epistemic
guide to spiritual wisdom, the importance of judgment leading to commitment to action,
and the cognitive potential of different religions and cultures.
HUMANISM: ALESSANDRO VALIGNANO SJ vs. POPE BENEDICT XIV
Traditional and pre-Vatican II Catholic theology and philosophy in which the Jesuits, like
other Catholic clerics, would have been trained, tended to be based on premises from
scholastic philosophy that were heavily a priori, or derived from the authority of
Scripture and magisterium. While critics at the time and subsequently saw scholastic
philosophy and ecclesial authority as objectionable, the real problem was the apparent
rejection of, or perhaps more precisely, the attempt to limit and control science and
experience.
From the foundation of the Society of Jesus in 1540 to its suppression in 1773, and
again from its restoration in 1814 to Vatican II (1962-65), its members had a well-worked
out philosophy (usually Thomist or Suarezian) and were thoroughly grounded in postTridentine systematic theology. Few theological uncertainties were to be found among
them; and, epistemologically, certainty was a virtue in that era. At the same time, their
strong faith-commitment and conviction that the Christian Church was the indispensable
means to salvation made them strongly missionary, leading them to bring the gospel to
the peoples of Asia and the Americas. However, in fulfilling that mission, they were also
humanist. Their Renaissance-based humanism led their missionary zeal to take seriously
the language and cultures of the peoples they sought to evangelize, a stance most
associated with Alessandro Valignano SJ (1539-1606). They did not just seek to ‘know’
those peoples, in the sense of knowledge as acquaintance; they also sought to understand
how different peoples interpreted the world. In short: their knowing of their target people
and intended converts came to involve cognitively embracing their culture, which
included knowing how those people knew and interpreted their experience.
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A significant instance was the Jesuit missionary project in China from 1600 to 1773.3
As early as Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), the Jesuits interested themselves in Confucianism,
as a natural quasi-religion. They also took Chinese culture seriously in a way that many
of their European contemporaries did not. The contrast in that period between the Jesuit
and the Franciscan approaches to evangelizing the Chinese is vivid testimony to Jesuit
humanism. This divergence in culture distanced the Jesuits from the dominant Roman
view, leading to the clash between Rome and the Jesuits in the Chinese rites controversy.
The fact that the pope who finally decided the issue was Benedict XIV (1740-58),
perhaps the most enlightened pope between the Council of Trent (1545-63) and Vatican
II, indicates the depth and seriousness of the clash: it was no mere misunderstanding.4
The clash over rites and religion reveals an underlying epistemological divergence.
The Jesuits believed there was important knowledge to be had through immersing
themselves in Chinese culture, partly because some of it would probably lead them to
discover how to mediate Jesus Christ to Chinese culture, and partly because Chinese
culture seemed of value for its own sake as a way of interpreting experience, the world,
and human nature. Their opponents deemed such inculturation unsound, thinking nonChristian ideas would dilute the gospel message, making it harder for the Chinese (and
the Jesuits themselves) to know who Christ was and where he was to be found. They
judged that the results of such inculturation could not possibly be epistemologically
authoritative: it was bad enough for the Jesuits to argue that inculturation was good, it
was worse to suggest that it was necessary to the point that the gospel could not be
communicated to the Chinese except through Chinese culture.
VATICAN II: SIGNS OF THE TIMES
The conventional view of Vatican II is that it was an ‘opening-up’ moment for the
Catholic Church. From a condemnatory mode of rhetoric going back to the 16th century
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The Jesuits didn’t confine themselves to “high” culture. In the 17th century, they also
studied the cultures of North American natives, as the multivolume Jesuit Relations
shows. For important papers on these topics, see John W. O’Malley et al, eds, The
Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540-1773 (University of Toronto Press, 1999).
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Council of Trent, continued and heightened from 1815 to the 1950s, and a generally
fearful and defensive stance towards the modern world, the Catholic Church suddenly
began to express a cautious openness, even a willingness to listen and learn.
The view that Vatican II represents a revolutionary moment for the Catholic Church
is, no doubt, rather crude in its sweeping generalization, but it has sufficient accuracy to
let it stand. As Vatican II recedes into the past, historians are increasingly able to discern
the continuities with previous developments, such as Pius XII’s opening doors to
Catholic scripture scholarship and liturgical reform.
At the time, it was amazing to hear an ecumenical council of the Catholic Church, not
merely accept the principle of freedom of religion, but also commence its document
about the Church’s stance towards the modern world as follows: ‘The joys and the hopes,
the griefs and the anxieties of the people of this age … are the joys and hopes, the griefs
and anxieties of the followers of Christ’. It continues: ‘the Church has always had the
duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the
Gospel. Thus, in language intelligible to each generation, she can respond to the perennial
questions which people ask about this present life and the life to come... We must
therefore recognize and understand the world in which we live, its explanations, its
longings, and its often dramatic characteristics … True, there is a growing exchange of
ideas, but the very words by which key concepts are expressed take on quite different
meanings in diverse ideological systems’.5 Such a note had never been struck before in
official Church documents, not because the pre-Vatican II Church had been opposed to
such ideas but because it hadn’t thought them important.
Where the Church had seen its role as that of handing on the message of Christ,
presenting and teaching Catholic doctrine clearly and precisely, it now seemed to want to
listen also: it was not abandoning its traditional role, but it was also expressing a novel
epistemological openness. The novelty lay not in prelates and priests being open to new
ideas and insights, but in their taking such openness to be of value for its own sake: first,
as an intellectual, cognitive or epistemic virtue and second, as directly relevant to
effective evangelization and communication of the Christian faith.
5

See http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vatii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html: Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes, nn. 1 and 4.
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In the extract quoted from Gaudium et Spes, the points of epistemological interest
include (i) the claim that anything belonging to the range of human experience or interest
is relevant to understanding the Christian message, so must be cognitively appropriated
by the Church, (ii) the requirement that the Church identify and interpret ‘the signs of the
times’, (iii) the importance of being receptive to the questions and concerns of the people
of the age, and (iv) the difficulty of understanding where humanity is situated on its
historical journey, given major cultural change, technological revolution, ideological
clashes, and even shifts in linguistic and conceptual meaning.6
VATICAN II: STABLE TRUTH, DEVELOPING TEACHING
From an epistemological perspective, the most significant moment at Vatican II may
have come in Pope John XXIII’s opening address to the council. The pope, probably
reflecting the influence of the nouvelle theologie or ressourcement theology of de Lubac,
Congar, Chenu, Rahner, and Balthasar, created space for fresh inquiry and new insights
by stating: ‘The deposit or the truths of faith .. are one thing, while the mode in which
they are enunciated, keeping the same meaning and the same judgment, is another’.7 No
truths of faith would be denied or rejected. But new formulations could be developed for
those truths, fresh interpretations were to be encouraged, traditional truths could be
deepened or further elaborated, and maybe new truths emerge.
The pope’s comment illustrates something important about human cognition.
Epistemological concern is not confined to coming to know new things or recognize
previous. It also embraces (a) exploration of what we know in part, since most knowledge
is partial, (b) deeper understanding of what is already known to be true, (c) application of
what we know to situations not hitherto encountered, with the result that we may
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It is doubtful if many bishops at Vatican II had read Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1962), published the year the council
assembled. But the views expressed in the passage quoted from Gaudium et Spes reflect a
similar sense of cultural and semantic transformations.
7
John XXIII, Opening address to Vatican II, n 6: ‘Est enim aliud ipsum depositum Fidei,
seu veritates .. aliud modus, quo eaedem enuntiantur, eodem tamen sensu eademque
sententia’. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/speeches/1962/documents/hf_jxxiii_spe_19621011_opening-council_lt.html
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understand that truth in new ways, and (d) translation of the language within which the
truth is expressed into other formulations.
JESUITS BEFORE VATICAN II: NEW PATHS TO THEOLOGY
The change at Vatican II had been in the making since the 1920s, and Jesuits had been
prominent among its makers. To describe what they contributed would take several
books; here I merely point to the epistemological dimensions.
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin was a palaeontologist and cosmologist who, influenced by
Henri Bergson’s L’Évolution Créatrice, grappled with the challenge that evolution
appeared to present, not directly to formal Catholic doctrine, but more to the general
network of ideas and concepts that made up Catholic tradition(s) on anthropology. By the
late 1930s, he was in trouble with Church authorities for his openness to Darwinian
theories of evolution, who did not share his sense of the importance of approaching the
evolutionary aspects of anthropology scientifically. Given the importance of evolution,
however, somebody had to knock forcefully on the Church’s door, even though it might
produce a “Shoot-the-messenger” reaction. Teilhard stood in a long Jesuit tradition of
openness to new knowledge in knocking loudly, and in accepting the personal sacrifices
involved in remaining faithful to science.
Henri de Lubac SJ ’s Catholicisme: les aspects sociaux du dogme (Paris 1938) was
significant in proposing the Fathers of the early Church, rather than the medieval
scholastics, as offering a more fruitful epistemological model for developing an up-todate theology. His later work promoted this essentially epistemological ‘ressourcement’
and was influential at Vatican II.
In the years after Vatican II the term ‘theological reflection’ was often heard. In many
theologates, students were encouraged, not simply to learn the tradition and familiarize
themselves with the Church’s doctrines, but also to ‘do’ theology themselves. Professors
bred under the older scholastic system would have wondered if this notion was not
merely an empty rhetorical flourish. However, the ressourcement movement could point
to the Fathers as providing but an example of theological praxis, since they were bishops

6

and pastors developing theological thought in response to pastoral need. They modeled
how to do theology, in a way responsive to the concerns of the people of their times.8
In the 1930s, Karl Rahner’s doctoral dissertation treated epistemological issues in
Thomas Aquinas from a perspective influenced by Kant, Heidegger, and another Jesuit,
Joseph Maréchal. His dissertation-director Martin Honecker judged it unacceptably
Heideggerian.
In the 1930s and 1940s, Jesuits such as the Frenchmen de Lubac and Yves de
Montcheuil and the German Alfred Delp, all involved in active resistance to the Nazi
regime, became keenly aware of the social and political dimensions of human existence
as sources of knowledge for a more adequate theological anthropology. Montcheuil was
influenced by Maurice Blondel’s focus on the primacy of action, and on what might be
called the importance of knowing-by-doing. Scholastic philosophy’s notion of experience
was increasingly seen as too narrowly Aristotelian or Humean in its focus on sense-data.
Montcheuil and Delp died at the hands of the Nazi regime, but Jesuits (like de Lubac)
who survived had been transformed, almost overwhelmed, by their experience, and preKantian categories seemed quite inadequate to the experience of war, occupation, and
genocide. They meant something quite new in the Catholic theological tradition when
they argued that theology must arise from lived experience.
JESUIT MISSIONS: ATHEISM
Vatican II called on religious orders to renew themselves in line with their founder’s
charism. The Society of Jesus duly made a start at its 31st General Congregation (196566).9 In his opening address to the Jesuits assembled for GC 31, Pope Paul VI asked the
Society to tackle the distinctively modern phenomenon of atheism. Distinguishing
between the state atheism of contemporary Communist states, philosophical atheism, and
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In reading de Lubac and the others, we are most aware of their criticisms of standard
theological and philosophical positions; but in historical perspective, we see the
continuities between them and the scholastics. Furthermore, intellectual and cultural
contexts change: in some, the scholastic systematic approach might be precisely what is
needed.
9
From here, I abbreviate ‘General Congregation’ to ‘GC’, followed by the congregation
number.
7

what he called ‘hedonistic’ atheism, he called on Jesuits to study atheism seriously and
systematically.10 It wasn’t like being asked to combat Protestantism or heresy, where the
issue was to clarify Christian doctrine and defend the orthodox variant of it, for atheism
was not a doctrine that defined a particular group.
In their response, Decree 3 of the GC 31 documents, the Jesuits showed that they
understood that it also involved seeking to understand modern atheism, that the view of it
current before Vatican II was dated and inadequate, and that acquiring understanding
required significant dialogue with atheists.11 The sources of atheism appeared to be
many: ideological Marxism, a kind of materialism encouraged by the rise in material
wellbeing, simple de-Christianization in older Christian countries such as France, and the
Church’s frequent support of ultra-conservative causes and perceived hostility to modern
culture and modern science.
Like the Church, the Society of Jesus in the 1960s was changing its response to the
world. The traditional approach would have taken an ontological stance on the facts: the
facts are that atheism is irrational and false, since its anthropology is mistaken on several
major points, so let that be reiterated firmly. Now came a shift of emphasis to an
epistemological stance: (a) If atheism could be understood, it could be more effectively
countered and defeated; (b) Acquiring that understanding is not just a matter of
identifying false philosophical theses, but also exploring why modern people are drawn
to it; (c) Doing this requires culturally wider and more open-minded engagement.
The next step, unacknowledged because not fully realized in 1965, was: (d) Such
engagement with atheism could shift Jesuit goals from opposing atheism to clarifying it,
dialoguing with it, and living with it. Atheism as an ideological or philosophical
movement would probably be around for reasons that the cultural historian would be
better placed to address than the philosopher, so refuting atheism, while important, was
not as overridingly important as might have been thought. Atheists, agnostics and the
indifferent were persons whose need called Jesuits to walk with them.
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See John W. Padberg, ed. Jesuit Life and Mission Today: The Decrees and
Accompanying Documents of the 31st-35th General Congregations of the Society of Jesus.
(St Louis, MO: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2009), p. 231.
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In any case, winning arguments was relevant only to atheism of the doctrinaire kind,
which did not flourish in the post-1965 era. Academic Jesuit philosophers or theologians
did occasionally engage in well-publicized debates with unbelievers. In 1948, English
Jesuit Frederick Copleston, author of a famous multi-volume history of philosophy,
debated Bertrand Russell on BBC radio, and from the 1950s to the 1970s Jesuits could be
found at academic conferences with such Marxists as Roger Garaudy.
Since about 2000, the challenge from what have been labeled the ‘New Atheism’
(with Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and even Stephen Hawking falling under this
label) has appealed to science as an epistemic authority that proves religion to be false
and God not to exist. In some ways, the New Atheism is quaintly old-fashioned, harking
back to Enlightenment ideas about the universal scope of science and instrumental
reason. Jesuits have been involved in responding to the critique. Some have argued that
various developments relating to what astrophysicists sometimes term the ‘fine-tuning’ of
the universe support or at least show the theist stance as not unreasonable and no more
implausible than the atheist stance.12 In that respect, the Jesuit response was one with
long roots in Jesuit history, going back to the Society of Jesus’s early engagement with
science through such Jesuit contemporaries of Galileo as Kristoph Klau (Christopher
Clavius), who developed the Gregorian calendar still in use, and in the age of the
Enlightenment through Jesuits such as Rudijer Boscovic.
Others have focused on highlighting the epistemological distinctions between the
sciences, metaphysics, and theology, making the case for the position that the sciencereligion clash is something of a mirage.13 They have also drawn attention to the
importance of disciplinary boundaries within science, noting the difficulty of identifying
what scientific method is, and effectively queried the supposition that there is such a
thing as ‘science’ as distinct from particular sciences. Modern philosophers, including the
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See Robert J. Spitzer, New Proofs for the Existence of God: Contributions of
Contemporary Physics and Philosophy (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2010). See
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Science and Theology (Springer, 2008); Guy Consolmagno, ed., The Heavens Proclaim:
Astronomy and the Vatican (Vatican Observatory Publications, 2009).
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See Séamus Murphy 2007, ‘Science vs. Religion: The Phony War’. Studies, Irish
Jesuit Quarterly 96 (2007): 245-256.
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logical positivists, Husserl and the phenomenologists, and Heidegger have recognized the
epistemological significance of the fact that the sciences differ among themselves both
with respect to the entities they treat and with respect to their methodologies.14
The relationship between the sciences and theology remains a significant issue for
Jesuit engagement with contemporary scientific and philosophical culture. In the ongoing
multiplication of disciplinary specialization and the increased divergence of those
disciplines, Jesuits sense a challenge to the Renaissance humanist view of the unity of
knowledge and seek in their universities to respond to that.15
JUSTICE AND INTERDISCIPLINARY ISSUES
GC 32 (1974-75) was momentous principally for two reasons.
First, the Congregation committed itself to the proposition that the promotion of
justice is an ‘absolute requirement of’ or ‘integral to’ the service of faith. Social justice
was clearly uppermost in the minds of the delegates, even if the justice that is integral to
the service of faith is necessarily broader than social justice.16 Referring to Paul VI’s
mission to the Society of Jesus of combating atheism, GC 32 expressed the sense that
social injustice, often global in extent, sometimes structural and state-sponsored in nature,
both reflected and reinforced a kind of practical atheism.17 While it was easy enough to
find Scriptural and patristic support for that claim, what was striking was the change in
emphasis: the Jesuits had come quite a distance in their interpretation of the world since
1965 when their talk about atheism seemed primarily concerned with the ideas of people
such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Nikita Khruschchev.18 Now their judgment was that the
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The most famous Jesuit epistemologist of the 20th century was Bernard Lonergan
(1904-84), whose two major works, Insight (Longmans, 1957) and Method in Theology
(Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972) direct attention to these issues, notably in his
discussion of functional specialties.
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See, for example, http://www.luc.edu/mission/index.shtml for Loyola University
Chicago’s mission statement, in particular the document ‘Transformative Education’.
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See Séamus Murphy, ‘The Many Ways of Justice.’ Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits
26/2 (1994).
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GC 32, nn. 76-79; in Padberg 2009, p. 305.
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It would be easy to retort that Jesuits had been well aware of social injustice long
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spread of atheism had more to do with social structures and mass culture than with
philosophical ideas.
A Jesuit who was particularly influential both as catalyst and as non-academic
synthesizer of these disparate trends in the Society of Jesus in the early 1970s was the
Jesuit general, Fr Pedro Arrupe. He had survived the atomic bomb blast at Hiroshima
and, along with Jesuits who had been marked by their war-time experiences, seemed
striking proof of the epistemic authority of experience, particularly extreme social
experience, as distinct from (and in some sense trumping) the authority of academic
theology and philosophy.19 Fr Arrupe communicated to young Jesuits in a way that no
previous or subsequent Jesuit general (except Ignatius) has matched, and his addresses
seemed to suggest that knowledge without social commitment was without value.20
It is not surprising that the ‘we-need-to-learn’ note was struck more strongly at GC 32
than at GC 31. GC 32 admitted: ‘Too often we are insulated from any real contact with
unbelief and with the hard, everyday consequences of injustice and oppression’.21
Accordingly, it called for greater experiential learning through insertion into the lives of
the poor and marginalized. In response, a number of Jesuits undertook initiatives in this
direction with varying degrees of success.
In order to understand the nature of oppressive social structures that should be
transformed in the interest of human liberation, GC 32 also directed Jesuits’ attention to
the social sciences. 22 Liberation theology had emerged in Latin America a few years
earlier, and its popular slogan was that theology should be done with the Bible in one
hand and the newspaper in the other. Among Latin American liberation theologians and
European political theologians it was widely held that theology’s privileged dialogue
partner should be sociology or economics, not philosophy.

such as the Latin American Jesuit educational movement Fe y Alegría founded in the
1950s by Fr José Maria Vélaz SJ. What was novel was that the experience of social
injustice was now beginning to change their thinking about what evangelization meant.
19
As one commentator put it later, late 20th century people (including Jesuits) rejected the
experience of authority in favour of the authority of experience.
20
I owe this point to Steve Schloesser.
21
GC 32, nn. 84, 96-99; in Padberg 2009, pp. 306-310. It was also struck at GC 34 in its
document on women in Church and society; see GC 34, n. 372, in Padberg 2009, p. 618.
22
GC 32, nn. 84, 93; in Padberg 2009, pp. 307-8.
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At the same time, GC 32 noted a crisis in Jesuit attitudes to philosophy, and perhaps to
reason in general: ‘From different parts of the Society it has been reported that
philosophical studies in recent hears have suffered deterioration’.23 In some respects and
in much of the Society of Jesus in the late 1960s, philosophy had ‘lost its way’: in the
post-Vatican II years, theology was in a state of ferment and excitement, having liberated
itself from the scholastic philosophy that had supported – and constrained – it up to
Vatican II. No doubt that meant many Jesuit philosophers were out of work, but the
deeper issue was that with respect to philosophical foundations Jesuit theologians and
Jesuits in general were adrift. One response was that philosophy could be replaced by the
social sciences. A number of Jesuits were directed towards studies in sociology. Forty
years later the outcome of that commitment suggests that the Jesuits involved were not
quite sure what to do with sociology in order to transform their theological understanding
of their corporate ministry.
It gradually became clear that if theology was to be connected fruitfully with the
social sciences philosophy was indispensable. Drawing attention to the fact that
economics and sociology were empirical disciplines while theology was not, Francisco
Ivern SJ warned of the danger of giving a theological stamp of approval to a particular
economic theory (e.g. dependency theory, widely influential on the thinking of liberation
theologians in the 1970s) or of claiming a quasi-scientific status for one particular
theological approach (such as liberation theology).24 His point was that valid linkage of
theology with any science required philosophy, specifically epistemology and philosophy
of science, as a kind of transformer or mediator. Epistemology and philosophy of science
were needed to identify and distinguish between the different kinds of knowledge
provided by theology and the social sciences.
How successful Jesuits (or others) have been in linking the social sciences and
theology so as to produce something substantially new in the forty years since GC 32 is
unclear. Today, the verdict would probably be that it has not yet been achieved. In
economics, Jesuits have not been immune to the temptation to escape into anti-

23

GC 32, n. 156; in Padberg 2009, p. 326.
Francisco Ivern SJ, ‘The Future of Faith and Justice: A Critical Review of Decree
Four’. Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits 14/5, pp. 18-20 (1982).
24
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intellectual populism as response to globalization and the collapse of communism. Jesuits
who became sociologists often seemed philosophically underdeveloped, unable to think
their way through the positivistic limitations of traditional sociology.
Matters became worse later. From the 1980s onwards, the seductive attractions of
post-modernism influenced many Jesuits, in theology, philosophy, and sociology, far
more than was healthy for the Society of Jesus’s intellectual and theological
commitments. It was one thing to shift emphasis from ontology to epistemology; it was
quite another to abandon metaphysics or to regard truth and objectivity as mere cultural
tools for Western hegemonistic oppression.
CLASHING EPISTEMOLOGIES
The second reason that GC 32 was so momentous was that it revealed, and also
exacerbated, rising tensions between Pope Paul VI and the Society of Jesus. Those
tensions later reached crisis point under Pope John Paul II in 1980-81. I suggest that the
tensions can be viewed interestingly from the prism of conflicting epistemologies.
Pope Paul VI’s opening address to the Jesuits assembled to commence the General
Congregation was lengthy and serious. One expects popes to admonish, or at least
suggest reforms, when they officially register the fact that the Jesuits are convening a
General Congregation, the equivalent of a general chapter for other religious orders. But
this time there seemed to be more involved. The pope expressed his sense that the Jesuits
no longer knew who or what they were. He invited them to reflect on the questions
‘Where do you come from?’, ‘Who are you?’, and ‘Where are you going?’ and proceeded
to give his own answers.25 To the first question, he recalled their history, and to the
second he stated that they were religious, priests, apostles, and united with the pope
through the special vow of obedience to the pope.
Much of what he said was laudatory of Jesuit achievements, and he praised their
willingness to engage in intellectual ministry: ‘Wherever in the Church, even in the most
difficult and most extreme fields, in the crossroads of ideologies, in the front line of
social conflict, there has been and there is confrontation between the deepest desires of
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Padberg 2009, pp. 380ff.
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man and the perennial message of the Gospel, there also there have been, and there are,
Jesuits.’26 This was praise indeed, but many Jesuits differed profoundly from the pope
with respect to what was involved in Jesuit encounters with others at the ideological
crossroads. Where the Jesuits might have thought dialogue and learning was the goal, the
pope had something else in mind.
For he then demanded: ‘And why then do you doubt?’ He told them that the doubts
they experienced were precisely what was to be experienced in a world hostile to God,
and complained: ‘You are as well aware as we are that today there appears within certain
sectors of your ranks a strong state of uncertainty, indeed a fundamental questioning of
your very identity …What is the state of acceptance and loyal witness in regard to the
fundamental points of Catholic faith and moral teaching as set forth by the ecclesiastical
magisterium?’ He went on to criticize a desire for novelty for its own sake that he
detected in the Society of Jesus, and among other things urged the Jesuits to be more
discerning between the demands of the world and those of the Gospel.27
Of interest here are the charges of doubt, uncertainty, and the apparent pursuit of
novelty for its own sake. While linked to loss of faith, as well as to a kind of moral
weakness, they also imply a kind of epistemological failure: a loss of intellectual nerve
and conviction through being too open-minded to the world.
At the time, many Jesuits viewed Paul VI and his advisers as intellectually timorous
and closed. They saw the pope as taking Vatican II to be a point of terminus, with the
remaining task for the Church to be reception of the council’s decrees, whereas they, as
progressive Jesuits, saw Vatican II as a point of departure in a radically changing world.
They wanted more openness to the global range of cultures and ideologies, while the
pope insisted that there was little point to being open to other positions if one no longer
understood one’s own position.
Which view was correct? Perhaps both, depending on one’s angle of perception. Some
of the pope’s more excitable advisors probably thought that heresy was rife among the
Jesuits, but even they knew that formal heresy would have been hard to identify, let alone
to prove. There was quite a diversity of socio-political views among Jesuits, although the
26
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Padberg 2009, p. 384.
Padberg 2009, pp. 384, 385, and 388.
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overall balance was more ‘left-wing’ than was the case among the pope’s advisors. But
focusing on this is sterile. While a few Jesuits rejected some Church teachings, the typical
Jesuit was not heretical, and didn’t think that a firm reaffirmation of dogma was the most
important thing needed.
Bernard Lonergan’s tri-partite structure of cognition seems a useful metaphor here to
image the divergence at GC 32. The Jesuits felt that the Church, of which they were a
microcosm, was still at the level of seeking insight and understanding, by trying to read
experience in new ways and by widening the scope of what was to count as experience,
and by seeking to think ‘outside the box’ without being constricted in a slightly uncritical
and even fearful way by focusing on dogma. The pope believed the range of possible
understandings and interpretations of the world and human experience that had emerged
in the previous decades was rich enough for the present, and that, at least with respect to
Jesuit identity, the stage of judgment had been reached, where specific propositions had
to be affirmed as true and other options excluded. No wonder there was a clash. I suggest
that the clash was not doctrinal or ontological (i.e. about how things are, or about what
propositions are to be affirmed and held as true) but epistemological: are we doing our
knowing well? The Jesuits could have defended themselves by saying that no doctrines
were being challenged by the Society of Jesus as a whole. Paul VI could have retorted
that understandings that never moved to judgment were epistemologically sterile.
On this front, the dialectic continues. Subsequent decades have been less tumultuous
than were the 1970s, the Jesuits have dwindled in numbers, and gradually a wary modus
vivendi was reached between later popes and the Jesuits. Pope Francis, the first Jesuit
pope, has repeatedly affirmed appreciation of cultural diversity and the epistemological
emphasis that sees the importance of listening and being willing to aim for new
insights.28 The Catholic Church has come a long way since the time of Pius X (1903-14)

In his homily at the Gesu church in Rome on January 3, 2014, the pope remarked: ‘to be
a Jesuit means to be a person of incomplete thought, of open thought: because one always
thinks looking at the horizon which is the ever greater glory of God, who ceaselessly
surprises us. And this is the restlessness of our void, this holy and beautiful restlessness!
However, because we are sinners, we can ask ourselves if our heart has kept the
restlessness of the search or if, instead, it has atrophied.’ See
http://www.zenit.org/en/articles/pope-francis-homily-at-mass-in-the-church-of-the-gesu
28
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when the anti-Modernist movement had become a veritable witch-hunt within the church,
hunting down any intellectual originality in theology or philosophy even when oriented to
orthodox ends.
On the other hand, Paul VI’s challenge has yet to be fully received by the Society of
Jesus.29 The Jesuits correctly grasped that knowing is culturally conditioned, and wanted
to be open to and accommodate other perspectives. It would then have been easy to
dismiss the pope as simply reasserting orthodoxy and demanding an end to creative
rethinking in theology and ethics. However, the pope’s point can be read more charitably,
as worried that cultural openness risked implicitly assuming that truth could never be
reached from a particular perspective, since all perspectives are limited and constrained.
But since all knowing is indeed perspectival, it follows that if truth is attainable it must be
attainable from a particular perspective. Culture and perspective may be critically
transcended, but cannot be escaped.
Furthermore, the pope’s address implied that to know how to go forward Jesuits
needed to remember where they were coming from. If the knower forgets who she is,
either losing her cultural and cognitive grounding or lacking critical awareness of her
cultural presuppositions, she cannot know, since she cannot judge and hence cannot grasp
truth and move, in informed faith, to action.30 The drive to inquire loses its moorings if its
metaphysical grounding in the culturally-rooted embodied cognitive agent is forgotten.
Finally, the epistemological drive loses its purpose and creative tension if its
metaphysical goals are considered impossible. Christian faith affirms that reality is
intelligible, that its intelligibility is independent of human knowers and their cognitive
constructs, and that it is knowable by human knowers. A post-modernist rejection of
ontology, and a historicist or culturally relativist stance that excludes the possibility of
truth, can only doom the Society of Jesus’s commitment to the intellectual apostolate,
since that commitment’s intelligibility assumes a coherent theology. The only option left

29

John Paul II reiterated the challenge in Veritatis Splendor (1993) and Fides et Ratio
(1998).
30
Not every judgment succeeds in arriving at the truth; truth is hard to come by. The
point is that if the real is merely conceptual, there is nothing for judgment to grasp,
nothing about which it can say ‘it is thus-and-so’; and without judgment, epistemology
degenerates into non-normative cultural studies.
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will be some kind of ‘retreat to commitment’, i.e. to a practical activism chasing an
elusive relevance.31
Philosophically, the implication was unavoidable: banishing metaphysics (along with
the possibility of truth-claims) meant the death of epistemology. Metaphysics that
foreclosed on epistemology meant a dogmatic sclerosis; epistemology that excluded
metaphysics quickly becomes pointless. The Jesuits and the pope needed each other.
CULTURE AND THEOLOGY
In GC 34 (1995) the Jesuits addressed culture. This widened GC 31’s focus on atheism
and shifted the angle of perception of GC 32’s theme of justice. There is thus a kind of
natural evolution in thought at work here, since the decrees of any Jesuit general
congregation reflect the reception of the decrees of previous general congregations. In
this instance, the work of Jesuits of inculturating the gospel in Asia and Africa was
bearing fruit. In addition, the creative contributions of such notable students of culture as
American Jesuit Walter Ong (1912-2003) and French Jesuit Michel de Certeau (1925-86)
played a significant role. The harvest of the explorations of ways of knowing involved in
the diversified Jesuit outreach to culture was rich.
However, GC 34’s document on culture shows hesitant uneasiness and intellectual
softness. On the one hand, it wished to express openness to those cultures where
Christianity had never put down deep roots, particularly in Asia and Africa. On the other,
it saw the importance of taking a critical stance towards various aspects of contemporary
(particularly Western) cultures. But it did not succeed in harmonizing these two
perspectives. The insights of H. Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture (1951) portraying
the different ways Christ is related to culture, whether in antagonism, affirmation,
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This is not a criticism of Jesuit social, spiritual, or pastoral ministries. The point is that
if the Society of Jesus drifted into thinking its intellectual engagements in theology,
philosophy and the sciences had little value (apart from an instrumental value of
providing teachers in Jesuit universities for undergraduates) it would indicate a profound
loss in the Society’s sense of what it means to hear and communicate the word of God.
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transcendence, or transformation, seemed forgotten at GC 34.32 The critical intellectual
edge the Jesuits had traditionally displayed seemed blunted.
To speak of this as a Jesuit intellectual crisis would be an exaggeration. It is more an
indicator of a kind of uncertainty, a continuing intellectual hesitation in the Society of
Jesus.33 A few years earlier, around 1989, the bicentennial of the French Revolution,
communism in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe had collapsed. The age of ideology,
as the early 20th century had been called, seemed over. The radically relativist disciples of
Kuhn and Feyerabend, the pragmatist disciples of Richard Rorty and Gianni Vattimo, as
well as the nihilistic thinkers in post-modernist thought, had moved in a direction of
rejecting truth and objectivity as Western cultural tools of oppression.34 While these
figures were a minority among philosophers, they were remarkably influential, joining up
with and reinforcing wider post-modernist culture.35
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
At GC 34, it also seemed that the great intellectual projects that Vatican II had put on the
table seemed to be yesterday’s agenda, not in the sense that the Jesuits no longer believed
in them but in the sense that the intellectual excitement and challenge involved had worn
off.
Those projects were, and necessarily had to be, theological in nature. They were not
primarily about scriptural theology, since Catholic scripture scholars had caught up with
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Paul VI, Evangelii Nuntiandi (1975) is more coherent in dealing with evangelization
and culture than is GC 34’s decree on culture. At one point the latter even suggested that
cultures had rights, oblivious of that claim’s implications for adopting a critical stance
towards cultures; see GC 34, n. 112, in Padberg 2009, pp. 544-545.
33
A landmark book is Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious
Pluralism (New York: Orbis, 1997). It reflects both success and ambiguity in
contemporary Jesuit engagement with religious and cultural plurality.
34
One well-known Indian Jesuit, influential as a retreat-giver and writer on spirituality,
would regularly dismiss objections to his claims as products of a “Western logic” and
hence lacking in rational cogency or force.
35
For a thoughtful Jesuit pastoral response, see Michael Paul Gallagher, Clashing
Symbols: An Introduction to Faith and Culture (Paulist, 2003). A collection of papers
that reflects post-modernist influence in the Jesuit world is Francis X. Clooney, ed, Jesuit
Postmodern: Scholarship, Vocation, and Identity in the 21st Century (Lanham:
Lexington, 2006).
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their Protestant counterparts and there was little controversy around Scripture in postVatican II years. Significant difficulties emerged in moral theology after Vatican II and
became sharper after 1980, reaching an impasse around 2000: ‘liberal’ moral theology
seemed too epistemologically shallow, while the conservative ‘restorationist’ project
(encouraged by John Paul II) was too dominated by a tacit desire for an antiepistemological stasis and doctrinal inertia. Help could only come from outside and that
depended on a revitalized systematic theology.
In the 1930-80 period, there were major strides in Catholic systematic theology,
through Jesuits Karl Rahner, Henri de Lubac, and Avery Dulles, ex-Jesuit Hans Urs von
Balthasar, diocesan priest Joseph Ratzinger, and Dominicans Yves Congar and MarieDominique Chenu. The break-through for these theological modernizers came in Vatican
II and what it made possible. The legacy of these theologians continues to influence. But
most had faded from the scene by the 1980s, some unhappy at post-conciliar
developments. They had made a revolution, probably to their surprise, but were not so
clear as to what was to come afterwards. They were creative, innovative, and
illuminating, but their work was also defined by its relation to pre-Vatican II theology
and Thomistic scholasticism. With that older world swept away, as it rapidly was after
the mid-1960s, the significance and influence of their work faded.
In the third millennium, with Vatican II already a half-century in the past, and its
battles largely historical now, a revitalized systematic theology is needed in the Catholic
Church, if such groups as the Society of Jesus are to regain their intellectual élan. The
Jesuits, like the Dominicans and a few other groups, are among those to whom the
Church looks to make such renewal possible.
I content myself here with drawing attention to Jesuit commitment to knowledge, and
to the epistemological tasks involved in acquiring knowledge. There are two principal
epistemological modes: critical and constructive. In the lead up to Vatican II, critical
thought was needed, involving a willingness to listen to those outside the Church and a
desire to rethink and develop Church doctrines in ways that eschewed easy answers. In
that mode, historically we can see the Jesuit epistemological contribution as critical,
placing distance between our ways of knowing, in all their cultural and contextual
diversity, and any systematic metaphysics that went beyond a vaguely general
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Weltanschauung. The other mode is constructive, and its goal is to be productive, to
midwife (as Socrates ambitioned) a metaphysic and an anthropology that is rich in
Christian thought, intuition, faith, and experience of practical love. If the critical mode
then required breaking the chains of a rigid and ossified conceptual system that passes for
orthodoxy, the constructive mode today will have to express itself in resisting the
enervating post-modernist sensibility that is skeptical of truth, anti-metaphysics, and
fearful of intellectual boldness. It is an essential service that Jesuits, who work in
epistemology, the sciences, or cultural studies, must offer if systematic theology is to
flower in our time.
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